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A BIG BANG COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
FOR GOD'S NONEXISTENCE 
Quentin Smith 
The big bang cosmological theory is relevant to Christian theism and other 
theist perspectives since it represents the universe as beginning to exist ex 
nihilo about 15 billion years ago. This paper addresses the question of 
whether it is reasonable to believe that God created the big bang. Some theists 
answer in the affirmative, but it is argued in this paper that this belief is not 
reasonable. In the course of this argument, there is a discussion of the meta-
physical necessity of natural laws, of whether the law of causality is true a 
priori, and of other pertinent issues. 
1. Introduction 
The advent of big bang cosmology in this century was a watershed for theists. 
Since the times of Copernicus and Darwin, many theists regarded science as 
hostile to their world-view and as requiring defence and retrenchment on the 
part of theism. But big bang cosmology in effect reversed this situation. 
The central idea of this cosmology, that the universe exploded into exis-
tence in a 'big bang' about 15 billion years ago or so, seemed tailor made 
to a theistic viewpoint. Big bang cosmology seemed to offer empirical 
evidence for the religious doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The theistic im-
plications seemed so clear and exciting that even Pope Pius XII was led 
to comment that 'True science to an ever increasing degree discovers God 
as though God were waiting behind each door opened by science. 'I But 
the theistic interpretation of the big bang has not only received widespread 
dissemination in popular culture and official sanction but also a sophisti-
cated philosophical articulation. Richard Swinburne, John Leslie and espe-
cially William Lane Craig2 have developed powerful arguments for theism 
based on a well-grounded knowledge of the cosmological data and ideas. 
The response of atheists and agnostics to this development has been compar-
atively weak, indeed, almost invisible. An uncomfortable silence seems to be the 
rule when the issue arises among nonbelievers or else the subject is briefly and 
epigrammatically dismissed with a comment to the effect that 'science has no 
relevance to religion. ' The reason for the apparent embarrassment of nontheists 
is not hard to find. Anthony Kenny suggests it in this summary statement: 
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According to the big bang theory, the whole matter of the universe began to 
exist at a particular time in the remote past. A proponent of such a theory, at 
least if he is an atheist, must believe that the matter of the universe came 
from nothing and by nothing.3 
This idea disturbs many for the reason it disturbs C. D. Broad: 
I must confess that I have a very great difficulty in supposing that there was 
a first phase in the world's history, i.e., a phase immediately before which 
there existed neither matter, nor minds, nor anything else .... I suspect that 
my difficulty about a first event or phase in the world's history is due to the 
fact that, whatever I may say when I am trying to give Hume a run for his 
money, I can not really believe in anything beginning to exist without being 
caused (in the old-fashioned sense of produced or generated) by something 
else which existed before and up to the moment when the entity in question 
began to exist.. .. I.. .find it impossible to give up the principle; and with that 
confession of the intellectual impotence of old age I must leave this topic.4 
Motivated by concerns such as Broad's, some of the few nontheists who have 
been vocal on this subject have gone so far as to deny, without due justifica-
tion, central tenets of big bang cosmology. Among physicists, the most noto-
rious example is Fred Hoyle, who vehemently rejected the suggestion of a 
big bang that seemed to imply a Creator and unsuccessfully attempted to 
construe the evidence for a big bang as evidence for an evolving 'bubble' 
within a larger unchanging and infinitely old universe (I am referring to his 
1970s post-steady-state theory5). An example of this contrary approach 
among philosophers is evinced by W. H. Newton-Smith. Newton-Smith felt 
himself compelled to maintain, in flat contradiction to the singularity theo-
rems of big bang cosmology (which entail that there can be no earlier state 
of the universe than the big bang singularity) that the evidence that macro-
scopic events have causal origins gives us 'reason to suppose that some prior 
state of the universe led to the production of this particular singularity. '6 
It seems to me, however, that nontheists are not put in such dire straits by 
big bang cosmology. Nontheists are not faced only with the alternatives of 
embarrassed silence, confessions of impotence, epigrammatic dismissals or 
'denial' when confronted with the apparently radical implications of big bang 
cosmology. It will be my purpose in this paper to show this by establishing 
a coherent and plausible atheistic interpretation of the big bang, an interpre-
tation that is not only able to stand up to the theistic interpretation but is in 
fact better justified than the theistic interpretation. But my argument is in-
tended to establish even more than this. 1 have elsewhere7 made the case that 
big bang cosmology does not lend support to theism but here 1 wish to make 
the stronger case that big bang cosmology is actually inconsistent with the-
ism. I will argue that if big bang cosmology is true, then God does not exist. 
The cosmological theory I shall discuss in this paper is the so-called 'stan-
dard hot big bang theory,' which is based on Friedmann's solutions to the 
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equations of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity and the Hawking-Pen-
rose singularity theorems. I shall explain these ideas in an introductory and 
nontechnical manner in section 2, so that philosophers who are unfamiliar 
with this theory may follow my argument. One point I wish to emphasize at 
the outset concerns the provisional status of the big bang theory. Cosmolo-
gists believe that this theory will one day be replaced by a cosmology based 
on a quantum theory of gravity and, consequently, theistic or atheistic con-
clusions that are derived from the 'standard hot big bang theory' must be 
treated with a similarly provisional status. 
After my introductory explanation of big bang cosmology in section 2, I 
outline the 'big bang cosmological argument for God's nonexistence' in sec-
tion 3. Most of the paper, sections 4-8, is devoted to responding to objections 
to the argument outlined in section 3. 
2. The Big Bang Cosmological Theory 
In this section the relevant aspects of the big bang theory are explained in 
four steps. These aspects will constitute the four scientific premises of the 
atheistic argument I shall construct in section 3. 
(i) The first step is the introduction of the so-called 'Einstein equation,' 
which is the heart of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity.8 Einstein's 
equation says, in simplified terms, that the geometry (curvature) of spacetime 
is determined by the distribution of mass and energy in spacetime. The equa-
tion may be simplified as 
(curvature of spacetime) = 8lt (density of matter). 
This equation suggests that if the matter in the universe is sufficiently dense, 
then the curvature of spacetime will become so great that it eventually curves 
to a point, as at the tip of a cone. The history of a particle or light ray is a 
path in spacetime, and if spacetime eventually curves to a point then these 
spacetime paths will converge and intersect at the point. If this intersection 
occurs at some time in the future, the point of intersection would seem to 
constitute the end of spacetime. If the intersection occurs in the past, such 
that the spacetime paths emerge from the point of intersection and gradually 
curve away from each other, the point of intersection would appear to con-
stitute the beginning of spacetime. This possibility leads to a discussion of 
the next relevant aspect of big bang cosmology. 
(ii) Einstein's equation admits of many solutions and it is an empirical 
question which solution describes our universe. The Friedmann solutions 
(first obtained by Friedmann in 1922 and 19249) are the ones thought to apply 
to our universe. His solution describe a universe that is perfectly isotropic (it 
looks the same in every direction) and perfectly homogeneous (matter is 
evenly distributed). If we apply to Einstein's equation a metric that describes 
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a perfectly isotropic and homogeneous universe, the Friedmann solutions are 
obtained, which in a simplified form read 
-3(acceleration of expansion or deceleration of contraction of the universe) 
- 41t (density of matter) 
The Friedmann solutions tell us that if there is matter evenly distributed 
throughout the universe, then the universe must be expanding at a decreasing 
rate or contracting at an increasing rate (except at the instant, if any, at which 
the expansion stops and changes to a contraction). To see this, note that the 
right side of the above (simplified) equation represents the density of matter 
mUltiplied by 41t. If there is matter present in the universe, then the matter 
density of the universe is positive. This implies that the right side of the 
equation, 41t (density of matter), will be positive. This in turn implies that 
the value for the acceleration of the expansion or the deceleration of the 
contraction will be negative. This is because the acceleration of the expansion 
or the deceleration of the contraction is multiplied by -3 and the result must 
be equal to the positive number represented by the right side of the equation. 
If the value of the expansion's acceleration is negative, this means that the 
universe is expanding at an ever decreasing rate. If the value of the 
contraction's deceleration is negative, this means that the universe is con-
tracting at an ever increasing rate. This result is of momentous significance, 
for it implies that if the universe contains evenly distributed matter then its 
existence is temporally limited. If the universe is contracting at an ever 
increasing rate, then it cannot contract forever but must eventually reach an 
endpoint, when it curves to a point and its radius becomes zero. If the universe 
is expanding at an ever decreasing rate, then it cannot have been expanding 
forever but must have begun expanding at some time in the past, when its 
radius began extending from zero. 
Let us further consider the case of expansion, since the universe is now 
expanding. The further we trace the universe into the past, the faster we 
find its rate of expansion. As the rate of expansion increases, the curvature 
of the universe and the density of matter increase and the radius of the 
universe decreases, until a time is reached when the curvature of the 
universe is infinite, the density of matter infinite and the radius of the 
universe is zero. Due to the infinite curvature, the past-directed spacetime 
paths of particles converge, such that each spacetime path ends at some 
point at which other spacetime paths also end. If the Friedmann equations 
describe a spherical universe, the universe is finite in extent and conse-
quently the past-directed spacetime paths all intersect in one point. All of 
matter is squeezed into this one point, which has zero spatial dimensions. 
This point exists instantaneously before exploding in the big bang. The in-
stantaneously existing point is a singularity, which means that it is an end-
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point of spacetime; there is no earlier time than the instant of the singularity 
for it itself is the first instant of time. On the other hand, if the universe 
is flat (uncurved) or hyperbolic (curved like a saddle) it is infinite in 
extent, which implies that the past-directed spacetime paths end in a spa-
tially one dimensional singularity. Only a finite volume of space can be 
compressed into a point; consequently, if there are an infinite number of 
spatial volumes of any given finite size (which there would be if the 
universe were flat or hyperbolic), then there must be an infinite number 
of points constitutive of the singularity. These points exist instantaneously 
(at the first instant of time) and then explode in an infinitely extended big 
bang. 
However, Friedmann's solutions to Einstein's equation do not by them-
selves show that our universe began in a big bang singularity. There exists a 
certain discrepancy between his solutions and the global features of our 
universe, a discrepancy that might seem to render inapplicable their predic-
tion of a big bang singularity. The statement and resolution of this problem 
leads to the third aspect of big bang cosmology that is pertinent to my 
argument. 
(iii) Friedmann's solutions are based on the assumption that the universe 
is perfectly isotropic and homogeneous. But this assumption is inconsistent 
with observational evidence, which reveals the universe to consist of clusters 
or superclusters of galaxies separated by vast stretches of empty or near 
empty space. The universe is isotropic and homogeneous only when averaged 
over distances of billions of light years. (For example, we may assume that 
different cubic regions of space differ in mass by less than one percent only 
if these regions are taken to be three billion light years or more in diameter.) 
This might suggest that the prediction of a big bang singularity is inapplicable 
to the universe since this prediction is based on the assumptions of perfect 
homogeneity and isotropy. The assumption of perfect isotropy entails that the 
relative motion of any pair of particles is purely radial and the assumption 
of perfect homogeneity entails there are no pressure gradients. The fact that 
our universe is imperfectly isotropic and homogeneous entails that past di-
rected spacetime paths of particles exhibit transverse velocities and cluster-
ings that make up clumpings of matter. This suggests that the paths will miss 
each other instead of converging at a point. This in tum suggests that the 
present expansion phase of the universe results from a 'bounce' that termi-
nated a prior contracting phase of the universe. But this suggestion of an 
oscillating universe was contradicted in the late 1960s by the Hawking-Pen-
rose singularity theorems,9A which demonstrate that under certain conditions 
imperfectly isotropic and homogeneous universes also originate in a big bang 
singularity. Precisely put, the theorems state that a singularity is inevitable 
given the following five conditions: 
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a) Einstein's General Theory of Relativity holds true of the universe. 
b) There are no closed timelike curves (i.e. time travel into one's past is 
impossible and the principle of causality is not violated). 
c) Gravity is always attractive. 
d) The spacetime manifold is not too highly symmetric; i.e., every space-
time path of a particle or light ray encounters some matter or randomly 
oriented curvature. 
v) There is some point p such that a\1 the past directed (or future directed) 
spacetime paths from p start converging again. This condition implies 
that there is enough matter present in the universe to focus every past 
directed (or future directed) spacetime path from some point p. 
The solutions for the Hawking-Penrose theorems show, as Hawking notes, 
that 'in the general case there will be a curvature singularity that will intersect 
every world line. Thus general relativity predicts a beginning of time. '\0 
(iv) The last aspect of big bang cosmology that I need as a premise in my 
argument for atheism is Hawking's principle of ignorance, which states that 
singularities are inherently chaotic and unpredictable. In Hawking's words, 
A singularity is a place where the classical concepts of space and time break 
down as do a\1 the known laws of physics because they are all formulated on 
a classical space-time background. In this paper it is claimed that this break-
down is not merely a result of our ignorance of the correct theory but that it 
represents a fundamental limitation to our ability to predict the future, a 
limitation that is analogous but additional to the limitation imposed by the 
normal quantum-mechanical uncertainty principle. II 
One of the quantum-mechanical uncertainty relations concerns the position 
q and momentum p of a particle. This relation states that Ap Aq ~ h/47t, which 
implies that if the position of a particle is definitely predictable then its 
momentum is not, and vice versa. The principle of ignorance is stronger in 
that it implies that one can definitely predict neither the position nor the 
momentum of any particles emitted from a singularity. In fact, this principle 
implies that none of the physical values of the emitted particles are definitely 
predictable. According to this principle, the big bang singularity 
'would ... emit all configurations of particles with equal probability.'12 
The unpredictability of the singularity implies that we should expect a 
chaotic outpouring from it. This expectation is in line with big bang 
cosmologists' representation of the early stages of the universe, for these 
states are thought to be maximally chaotic (involving complete entropy). The 
singularity emitted particles with random microstates, and this resulted in an 
over-all macrostate of thermal equilibrium. 
The significance of the principle of ignorance can be easily missed. It 
implies that the big bang singularity behaves in a completely unpredictable 
manner in the sense that no physical laws govern its behavior. The unpre-
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dictability of the singularity is not simply an epistemic affair, meaning that 
'we humans cannot predict what will emerge from it, even though there is a 
law governing the singularity which, if known, would enable precise predic-
tions to be made.' William Lane Craig assumes unpredictability to be merely 
epistemic; he writes that 'unpredictability [is] an epistemic affair which may 
or may not result from an ontological indeterminism. For clearly, it would be 
entirely consistent to maintain determinism on the quantum level even if we 
could not, even in principle, predict precisely such events.'!3 Now I grant that 
there are legitimate uses of 'unpredictability' that are merely epistemic in import, 
but this is not how the word is used in Hawking's principle of ignorance. The 
unpredictability that pertains to Hawking's principle of ignorance is an unpre-
dictability that is a consequence of lawlessness, not of human inability to know 
the laws. There is no law, not even a probabilistic law, governing the singularity 
that places restrictions on what it can emit. Hawking writes that 
A singularity can be regarded as a place where there is a breakdown of the 
classical concept of space-time as a manifold with a pseudo-Reimannian 
metric. Because all known laws of physics are formulated on a classical 
space-time background, they will all break down at a singularity. This is a 
great crisis for physics because it means that one cannot predict the future. 
One does not know what wiII come out of a singularity.14 
Deterministic or even probabilistic laws cannot obtain on the quantum level 
in the singularity, since there is no quantum level in the singularity; the 
space-time manifold that quantum processes presuppose has broken down. 
The singularity is a violent, terrifying caldron of lawlessness. As Paul Davies 
notes, 'anything can come out of a naked singularity-in the case of the big 
bang the universe came out. Its creation represents the instantaneous suspen-
sion of physical laws, the sudden, abrupt flash of lawlessness that allowed 
something to come out of nothing. '15 The question I shall examine is whether 
this primordial lawlessness is consistent with the hypothesis of divine cre-
ation. I shall argue it is not. 
3. The Big Bang Cosmological Argument for Atheism 
I shall use the four aspects of big bang cosmology explicated in the last 
section as the scientific premises of my atheistic argument. The first three 
scientific premises articulated in the last section, the Einstein equation, 
Friedmann's solutions to this equation and the Hawking-Penrose singularity 
theorems, provide us with the two premises 
(1) The big bang singularity is the earliest state of the universe. 
(2) The earliest state of the universe is inanimate 
(2) follows from (1) since the singularity involves the life-hostile conditions 
of infinite temperature, infinite curvature and infinite density. 
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The fourth scientific idea explained in the last section, the principle of 
ignorance, gives us the summary premise 
(3) No law governs the big bang singularity and consequently there is no 
guarantee that it will emit a configuration of particles that will evolve 
into an animate universe. 
(1)-(3) entail 
(4) The earliest state of the universe is not guaranteed to evolve into an 
animate state of the universe. 
My argument is that (4) is inconsistent with the hypothesis that God created 
the earliest state of the universe, since it is true of God that if he created the 
earliest state of the universe, then he would have ensured that this state is 
animate or evolves into animate states of the universe. It is essential to the 
idea of God in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition that if he creates a uni-
verse, he creates an animate universe, and therefore that if he creates a first 
state of the universe, he creates a state that is, or is guaranteed to evolve into, 
an animate state. If somebody says, 'it does not matter to God whether the 
universe he creates is animate or inanimate,' this person is operating with a 
concept of God that is at odds with classical theism. I think it would be 
granted by virtually all contemporary theists in the analytic tradition (M. and 
R. Adams, Craig, Menzel, Morris, Plantinga, Quinn, Schlesinger, Swinburne, 
Wainwright, Wolterstorff and many others) that God, if he creates a universe, 
intends his creation to be animate. Richard Swinburne writes, for example, 
that 'orderly universes' are those required by animate creatures and that 'God 
has overriding reason to make an orderly universe if he makes a universe at 
all. '16 
The above statement of the 'big bang cosmological argument for God's 
nonexistence' is of course just a starter, since the theist has available to 
himself or herself numerous counterarguments or objections. In the remainder 
of this paper I will state and respond to some of these objections. 
4. The Question of Divine Intervention 
One objection to the argument of section 3 is that it does not take into account 
the possibility of divine intervention. If the big bang singularity is lawless, then 
it is feasible for God to intervene at the instant of the singularity and supernat-
urally constrain it to explode in a certain way, namely, to explode by emitting a 
life-producing maximal configuration of particles. In this way, God can guaran-
tee that the earliest state of the universe will evolve into an animate state. 
But it is not at all obvious that this objection is consistent with the classical 
theist conception of the divine nature. God is omniscient, omnipotent and 
perfectly rational and it is not a sign of a being with these attributes to create 
as the first state of the universe some inherently unpredictable entity that 
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requires immediate 'corrective' intervention in order that the universe may 
be set on the right course. If God intends to create a universe that will 
eventually contain living beings, then there is no reason for him to begin the 
universe with a completely unpredictable singularity. In fact, choosing such 
a beginning is both irrational and inefficient. It is a mark of incompetent 
planning or poor design to create as the first natural state something that 
requires supernatural intervention 'right off the bat' to ensure that it leads to 
the desired outcome. The rational and efficient thing to do is to create some 
state that by its own lawful nature evolves into a life-containing universe. 
The problem I am alluding to is not that God institutes laws which he must 
immediately violate if his intentions are to be realized. The problem concerns 
God's intervention in his creation, not violations of the laws governing it. 
'God violates the natural law L' entails 'God intervenes in his creation' but 
there is no converse entailment, since God can intervene in natural events or 
processes that are not governed by laws. Since the big bang singularity is 
governed by no law, God's constraint that this singularity emit a life-produc-
ing configuration would be an instance of an intervention that is not a nomo-
logical violation. Accordingly, the objection that 'God can intervene in the 
explosion of the singularity so as to make it emit a life-producing configura-
tion of particles without violating his own laws' is an ignoratio elenchi, since 
my argument is instead that this intervention entails an incompetently planned 
first state. 
I would note, in addition, that my argument does not presuppose that there 
is a 'most rational, competent or efficient way of creating an animate 
universe' and therefore does not succumb to an analogue of the 'no best 
possible world' theodicy, such as the one developed by George Schlesinger. 17 
My argument presupposes only that there are efficient ways and inefficient 
ways, where an efficient way is one whereby animate states predictably 
evolve in accordance with natural laws and an inefficient way one whereby 
animates states do not evolve in accordance with natural laws but require 
divine interventions. 
5. The Question of the Reality of the Singularity 
It might be objected that a crucial premise of the atheistic argument, premise 
(I) that 'the big bang singularity is the earliest state of the universe,' is false 
since it is based on a reification of the singularity. The singularity is not a 
real physical state but a mathematical fiction. The earliest physical state is 
the big bang explosion, which is governed by physical laws. This explosion 
leads by a natural and lawful evolution to a state of the universe that contains 
living creatures. Accordingly, we are able to conclude that God created as 
the earliest state some state that by its own lawful nature evolved into an 
animate universe. 
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My response to this objection is that it is based on a misinterpretation of 
big bang cosmology, for this cosmology represents the singularity as real. For 
example, Penrose writes that "we think of the initial singularity as a single 
point [which] gives rise to an infinity of causally disconnected regions at the 
next instant,"18 which entails that the point is earlier than the explosion and 
therefore real. 
But this response may miss the point of the objection, which is not that big 
bang cosmologists represent the singularity as unreal, but that the singularity 
is unreal, given reasonable principles for interpreting scientific theories. This 
is the position of William Lane Craig and Richard Swinburne. Craig notes 
that the big bang singularity is represented as having zero volume and zero 
duration and that this is sufficient reason to regard it as unreal. He asserts 
that 'a physical state in which all spatial and temporal dimensions are zero 
is a mathematical idealization whose ontological counterpart is nothing. '19 
But Craig offers no justification for this assertion. Cosmologists find no 
difficulty in the concept of a space that has zero dimensions (a spatial point) 
and that exists for an instant and a simple assertion that a 00 space cannot 
instantaneously exist seems to be an expression of an unwarranted scepticism. 
Richard Swinburne also believes that the singular point is a mathematical 
idealization. He provides an argument for this, namely, that it is logically 
necessary that space be 30. Swinburne presents an argument against the 
logical possibility of 20 objects and suggests that analogous arguments can 
be constructed against 10 and 00 objects. He asks us to consider a two 
dimensional surface that contains two dimensional objects: 
•.. .it is clearly logically possible that the two-dimensional "material objects" 
should be elevated above the surface or depressed below it.. .the logical 
possibility exists even if the physical possibility does not. Since it is logically 
possible that the "material objects" be moved out of the surface, there must 
be places, and so points, outside the surface, since a place is wherever, it is 
logically possible, a material object could be. ·20 
Therefore, Swinburne concludes, if there exists a two dimensional object or 
surface there must also exist a third spatial dimension. Swinburne's argument 
instantiates the following invalid argument-form: 
(l) Fx is logically possible (Le. it is logically possible for x to possess the 
property F). 
(2) C is a necessary condition of Fx. 
(3) x exists. 
(4) Therefore, C exists. 
The fact that Swinburne's argument has this form becomes clear if we state 
his argument as follows: 
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(lA) It is logically possible for any object on a two dimensional surface to 
possess the property of moving above or below the surface. 
(2A) A third spatial dimension is a necessary condition of any object on a 
two dimensional surface moving above or below the surface. 
(3A) There exists an object on a two dimensional surface. 
(4A) Therefore, there exists a third spatial dimension. 
If (lA)-(4A) proves that objects on two dimensional surfaces require a third 
spatial dimension, then the following argument proves that there is a heaven: 
(IB) It is logically possible for any human body to be resurrected after 
death and occupy a heavenly space. 
(2B) Heaven is a necessary condition of any human body being resurrected. 
(3B) There are human bodies. 
(4B) Therefore, there is a heaven. 
The fallacy, if the reader has not already grasped it, is the assumption that a 
necessary condition of an object possessing a certain property must be actual 
if the object is actual. This of course is not so; the necessary condition need 
be actual only if the object's possession of the property is actual. I conclude 
that Swinburne has given us no reason to believe that it is impossible for 
there to be a big bang singularity that occupies less than three spatial dimen-
sions. Given that Swinburne's argument fails, and that no other arguments 
against the coherency of the big bang singularity have been presented (at least 
of which I am aware), the above considerations warrant the conclusion that 
there is no reason to deny reality to the big bang singularity. Thus, the 
problem of unpredictability remains. 
6. The Question of the Relative Simplicity 
of the Theistic and Atheistic Hypotheses 
There may not be any a priori truth that rules out the big bang singularity, 
but there is a probabilistic argument that supports the view that the universe 
began with a divinely created big bang explosion rather than with a God-in-
compatible singularity. The hypothesis of divine creation is simpler and for 
this reason is more likely to be true than the atheistic hypothesis. 
The argument that the theistic hypothesis is simpler has been made by 
Swinburne. He claims that God is simpler than the physical universe and 
therefore is more likely than it to exist unexplained. 'If something has to 
occur unexplained, a complex physical universe is less to be expected than 
other things (e.g., God). '21 If the physical universe is created by God then it 
has its explanation in God and consequently does not exist unexplained; in 
this case, only God exists unexplained. Since the hypothesis that only God 
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exists unexplained is simpler than the atheistic hypothesis, it is more likely 
to be true. 
The principle Swinburne is appealing to is 
(1) The more simple an existent is, the more likely it is to exist unexplained. 
I believe, however, that even if we grant Swinburne this and other of his 
premises it can be shown that considerations of simplicity support atheism 
rather than theism. Swinburne's criterion of simplicity is that there is a sim-
plicity 'about zero and infinity which particular finite numbers lack. '22 For 
example, 'the hypothesis that some particle has zero mass, or infinite velocity 
is simpler than the hypothesis that it has a mass of 0.34127 of some unit, or 
a velocity of 301,000 km/sec. '23 Likewise, a person with infinite power, 
knowledge and goodness is simpler than a person with a certain finite degree 
of power, knowledge and goodness. Furthermore, a person with infinite 
power, knowledge, etc., is simpler than a physical object that has particular 
finite values for its size, duration, velocity, density, etc. Assuming these 
premises, let us examine the hypothesis that a finite universe begins with an 
uncaused singularity. The singularity in question has zero spatial volume and 
zero temporal duration and does not have particular finite values for its 
density, temperature or curvature. It seems reasonable to suppose that by 
virtue of these zero and non-finite values this instantaneous point is the 
simplest possible physical object. If we grant to Swinburne that God is the 
simplest possible person and hold that God and the uncaused singularity 
cannot both exist (for reasons stated in the atheistic argument in section 3), 
then our alternatives are to suppose that either the simplest person exists and 
creates the four dimensional spatiotemporal universe or the simplest physical 
object exists and emits the four dimensional spatiotemporal universe. If we 
use criteria of simplicity, are there any reasons to prefer one of these hypoth-
eses over the other? It seems reasonable to suppose that the simplest possible 
physical object is equally as simple as the simplest possible person, such that 
there is no basis to prefer one over the other on grounds of intrinsic simplicity. 
Swinburne holds that God exists unexplained and so God and the simplest 
physical object are also on a par in this respect. But the hypothesis that the 
four dimensional spatiotemporal universe began from the simplest physical 
object is in one crucial respect simpler than the theistic hypothesis. It is 
simpler to suppose that the 4D physical universe began from the simplest 
instance of the same basic kind as itself, viz., something physical, than it is 
to suppose that this universe began from the simplest instance of a different 
basic kind, viz., something nonphysical and personal. The atheistic account 
of the origin of the 4D universe posits phenomena of only one basic kind 
(physical phenomena), whereas the theistic account of its origin posits phe-
nomena of two basic kinds (physical phenomena and disembodied personal 
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phenomena). Thus on grounds of simplicity the postulation of a singularity 
that explodes in a big bang wins out over the postulation of a deity that creates 
the big bang explosion ex nihilo. 
7. The Question of the Metaphysical Necessity 
of a Big Bang Universe 
According to essentialism, natural laws, such as the law that water is H20, 
are metaphysically necessary; they hold in all possible worlds, such that God 
could not have created a universe in which they are violated. Consequently, 
if it is a natural law that a universe obeying the Friedmann solutions to 
Einstein's equation and the Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems begins in 
a singularity, then God could not have created a Friedmann-Hawking-Penrose 
(FHP) universe otherwise than by first creating an unpredictable singularity. 
Given this, and given his desire that the universe be animate, he would then 
have to intervene to ensure that the universe be animate. This would not be 
a sign of inefficiency or bungling since this would be the only possible way 
in which an animate universe could be guaranteed. 
My response to this objection is that even if its essentialist assumption is 
sound, it does not follow that God must create a big bang singularity if he 
intends to create an animate universe. For the fact that certain natural laws 
are metaphysically necessary does not entail that they are necessarily instan-
tiated. If we borrow the symbolism, if not the position, of D. M. Armstrong,24 
we may say that a metaphysically necessary natural law is of a form such as 
(L) 0 (N (F,G» 
where F and G are universals and N a relation between them. N is the relation 
of nomic necessitation. Armstrong takes N to be primitive, but I think we can 
define N in terms of co-exemplification. (L) means that in every possible 
world in which F is exemplified, G is co-exemplified. If F is water and G 
H20, then (L) says that in each world in which being water is exemplified, 
being H20 is exemplified by whatever exemplifies being water. But (L) does 
not entail that For G is exemplified. The fact that water is H20 in every world 
in which there is water does not entail that there is water in every world. 
Analogously, the fact that a universe that satisfies the FHP laws begins in a 
big bang singularity in every world in which such a universe exists does not 
entail that there is a FHP universe in every world. For other sorts of universes 
are also possible, ones that satisfy other sets of laws, including sets of laws 
that enable an earliest state to be, or evolve predictably into, an animate state. 
If God exists and intends there to be an animate universe, he would have 
created one of these universes (or a beginningless animate universe). 
This response to the essentialist objection might be rejected on the grounds 
that essentialism and the FHP theory jointly entail that the only metaphysical 
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possible universes are FHP universes. Let F be the property being a universe 
and G the property being a FHP universe. According to (L), being a universe 
cannot be exemplified unless being a FHP universe is co-exemplified. 
I believe, however, that we can concede even this objection consistently 
with the soundness of the atheological argument. To see this, we must reflect 
on the evidence adduced for the metaphysical necessity of natural laws. 
Kripke, Putnam and other originators of essentialism have recognized that 
some reason must be given for holding a natural law to be necessary that 
defeats the standard reason for regarding them to be contingent, namely, that 
they can be coherently conceived not to obtain. The reason for holding some 
principles to be necessary, such as tautologies (all unmarried men are men), 
analytic principles (all unmarried men are bachelors) and synthetic a priori 
principles (all completely green objects are not simultaneously completely 
red), is that they cannot coherently be conceived to be false. But this is not 
the case for natural laws. As Putnam remarks, 'we can perfectly well imagine 
having experiences that would convince us (and that would make it rational 
to believe that) water isn't H20. In that sense, it is conceivable that water 
isn't H20. '2S But in this case, conceivability of being otherwise is a defeated 
guide to contingency, for considerations of how the reference of 'water' is 
established, in conjunction with scientific observations, show that water is 
necessarily H20. But I will not strictly follow Putnam in presenting "the 
argument from the rigidity of 'water'" since subsequent formulations have 
provided improved versions. Keith Donnellan26 offered a version improved 
over Putnam's and Nathan Salmon27 has improved upon Donnellan's version. 
But Paul Copeck28 has recently improved upon Salmon's version and I shall 
partly borrow from Copeck's version in the foIlowing summary statement of 
this argument. The first premise is a formalization of the rigid meaning of 
'water' in term's of the word's ostensive definition and the second premise 
is borrowed from current scientific theory: 
(1) It is necessarily the case that: something is a sample of water iff it 
exemplifies dthat (the properties PI, ... PD , such that PI, ... Pn are causally 
responsible for the observable properties [e.g. being tasteless, odorless 
and clear] of the substance of which that is a sample). 
(2) This (liquid sample) has the chemical structure H20, such that being 
H20 is the property causally responsible for the observable properties 
of being tasteless, odorless, clear, etc. 
Therefore, 
(3) It is necessarily the case that: every sample of water has the chemical 
structure H20. 
The word 'dthat' in premise (1) is Kaplan's rigidifying functor, which oper-
ates on 'that' to produce a demonstrative reference that is rigid. Now if we 
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construct an analogous argument for the necessity of a universe being FHP, 
it would appear as 
(4) It is necessarily the case that: something is an instance of a universe iff 
it exemplifies dthat (the properties P., ... Pn , such that P., ... Pn are caus-
ally responsible for the observable properties [e.g. receding galactic 
clusters, the background microwave radiation of 2.7 K] of the kind of 
which that is an instance) 
(5) This instance of a universe has a FHP structure, such that being an FHP 
universe is the property causally responsible for the observable proper-
ties of receding clusters, background radiation, etc. 
Therefore, 
(6) It is necessarily the case that: every instance of a universe has the 
property of being an FHP universe. 
I shall not challenge the soundness of (4)-(6) but merely show its soundness 
is consistent with the soundness of the big bang cosmological argument for 
God's nonexistence. It will be helpful if a parallel with the example of water 
is drawn. As Putnam has pointed out, there is another possible world W in 
which a substance has a certain chemical structure, XYZ, such that XYZ is 
causally responsible for the substance's observable properties of being a 
clear, odorless, tasteless liquid. This substance is not water but something 
whose observational properties are indistinguishable from those of water. 
This substance may be called 'water.,' such that it is metaphysically necessary 
that water. is XYZ. Analogously, there is another possible world W in which 
the cosmic structure responsible for the observable properties of receding 
clusters, background radiation, etc., is not a FHP structure but some other 
structure, say ABC. That which has this structure is not a universe, since 
'universe' rigidly refers to something with a FHP structure. But we can call 
it a 'universe.,' just as we can call XYZ 'water •. ' There are still other worlds 
in which the relevant observational properties do not include receding clus-
ters and background radiation but such properties as the systems of the Ptol-
emy, Copernicus, or Newton were thought to exemplify. What is causally 
responsible for these properties may be called 'an universe2,' 'an universe3,' 
etc. Accordingly, the proponent of the atheological argument may grant that 
God could not have created an animate universe without creating a big bang 
singularity, but he will point out that it would be irrational and incompetent 
on the part of God to create an animate universe; the rational thing to do is 
to create an animate universe., or an animate universe2, etc., such that these 
systems do not require divine interventions for animate states to be ensured. 
8. The Question of the Causal Principle 
The theist might retort at this point that the atheistic interpretation of big 
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bang cosmology is infected by a problem more severe than the problems of 
inefficient design and lesser simplicity that are faced by the theistic interpre-
tation. The atheist must suppose that the universe began to exist uncaused 
and this supposition violates the principle of causality (PI), that everything 
that begins to exist has a cause, a sufficient condition of its coming-into-ex-
istence. 
It will be admitted that this objection seems to have a certain force to it, 
inasmuch as it has seemed compelling to some nontheists (such as C. D. 
Broad, quoted in the introduction) and has provoked in them various reactions 
of denial, embarrassment and silence when faced with the implications of big 
bang cosmology. However, I believe this objection is untenable. For one 
thing, if the causal principle (PI) is taken as an empirical generalization it is 
false, since qQantum mechanics has shown that many particles (virtual parti-
cles) begin to exist without being caused to do so. If (PI) is taken to be 
synthetic and a priori, the evidence of which is its intuitive obviousness, then 
quantum mechanics again undermines it by providing many intuitively clear 
cases of particles springing into existence uncaused. If (PI) were true a priori, 
then quantum mechanics, the most successful scientific theory yet developed, 
would have to be consigned to the garbage heap, a prospect that no rational 
person would countenance. 
The theist, however, may retreat to one of two more conservative positions, 
each of which avoids the problems posed by quantum mechanics. One of 
these positions is to allow that particular things within the universe may 
spontaneously begin to exist, but that the universe itself cannot spontaneously 
begin to exist. The causal principle that is synthetically a priori is not (PI) 
but the weaker one (P2), that it is impossible for being to arise uncaused out 
of absolutely nothing. 
The second more conservative position involves retaining the original 
claim about all beginnings of existence but redefining 'cause' so that it no 
longer means a sufficient condition but a probabilistic condition of some 
degree. A probabilistic theory of causality, such as Wesley Salmon's, Patrick 
Suppes, Richard Otte's or David Papineau's29, may be adopted, with x being 
a cause of y if and only if x is antecedent to or simultaneous with y and x 
has a probability, which may be low, of being associated in a certain way 
with y. (The definitions of Salmon et al. are of course considerably more 
complicated and precise but it is not necessary to explain the details here.) 
Consider virtual particles that begin to exist in a vacuum. It could be said 
that the vacuum has a probability of a very low degree of being associated 
with the birth of a certain pair of virtual particles and in this sense is a 'cause' 
of the virtual particles. These reflections suggest a causal principle that is not 
violated by quantum mechanics but is violated by the atheistically interpreted 
big bang singUlarity, namely, (P3), that everything that begins to exist has a 
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probabilistic cause, with the relevant probability being greater than zero and 
possibly one. 
My comment about (P3) is that if it is an empirical generalization it is based 
on observations of the category of events for which it is logically possible 
that there be natural causes and therefore that there is no justification for 
supposing (P3) applies to events of a different category, to events for which 
it is logically impossible that there be natural causes. The initial state of the 
universe by definition has no natural cause and therefore falls outside of the 
scope of (P3). 
However, if (P3) were synthetically necessary its application would not be 
restricted to a certain empirical domain but could be construed as applying 
to everything, even the big bang singularity. (P3), like (P2), could be used to 
rule out on a priori grounds the atheistic interpretation of big bang cosmol-
ogy. But are either of these two principles synthetically a priori'! The evi-
dence that one of them would be synthetically a priori would be its 'intuitive 
obviousness.' This is Craig's position, for example; he insists that 'it is intu-
itively obvious that anything that begins to exist, especially the entire uni-
verse, must have a cause of its existence. '30 My response is to deny that either 
of these two principles is intuitively obvious. I suggested in an earlier section 
that there are four species of necessary truth, viz. (1) tautologies, (2» analytic 
truths, (3) synthetic a priori truths and (4) metaphysically necessary a pos-
teriori truths. Synthetic a priori truths are exemplified by 'Nothing that is 
green all over at time t is red all over at time l' and metaphysically necessary 
a posteriori truths are exemplified by 'Water is H20.' Now the issue before 
us concerns synthetic a priori truths, since the causal propositions are alleged 
to be of this sort. As I suggested in the previous section, the evidence that a 
proposition is a synthetic a priori truth is that it cannot be conceived to be 
false (in any possible world) and is not tautological or analytic. This is clearly 
the case for 'Nothing that is green all over at time t is red all over at time t. ' 
It cannot be conceived to be possibly the case that something, say, a piece of 
grass, is green all over at t and yet is simultaneously red. But this is not the 
case for our causal propositions. I can conceive the possibility of the universe 
beginning to exist uncaused. This uncaused beginning may be utterly aston-
ishing, but it can be conceived to possibly occur, unlike a blade of grass 
simultaneously being both green all over and red all over. 
Craig responds to this line of argument as follows: 'We can picture in our 
mind's eye the universe springing into existence uncaused, but the fact that 
we can construct and label such a mental picture does not mean the origin of 
the universe could really have come about in this way. '31 But this response 
is unsound since it is based on a failure to distinguish between a posteriori 
and a priori metaphysically necessary truths. It is true of the a posteriori 
metaphysical necessities that the conception of them as possibly not obtaining 
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is not evidence that they are not necessary. I can conceive water to be XYZ 
rather than H20, but that is not a reason to think that it is not metaphysically 
necessary that water is H20. But it is the distinguishing mark of a priori 
metaphysical necessities that they cannot be conceived to possibly not obtain; 
this is precisely why they are said to be 'known a priori.' If the universe can 
be conceived to possibly begin uncaused, then that is conclusive evidence 
that the universe cannot begin uncaused is not a synthetic a priori proposi-
tion. To deny this is to suppose that this causal principle is an a posteriori 
metaphysically necessary truth, and no one, to my knowledge, has maintained 
that implausible supposition. Thus, I think it is rational to believe that the 
universe can begin uncaused and therefore that the objection based on 'the 
causal principle' fails. 
By way of conclusion, I would point out that even if all my arguments in 
this paper are sound, that does not entail God does not exist. For big bang 
cosmology may be false. But even if it is true, atheism does not follow, since 
there are other objections to my argument I have not considered. Some of 
these unconsidered objections have been considered elsewhere, however. For 
example, I have argued32 it makes no sense to suppose that God knows, 
logically prior to creation, that if the universe were to begin with a singularity, 
this singularity would emit a life-producing configuration of particles, since 
the supposition that this counterfactual is true logically prior to creation is 
inconsistent with the essential semantic properties of counterfactuals. But 
there are also other objections I have not considered elsewhere (including, 
obviously, those I have so far not even thought of). So my final position is 
that the atheistic conclusion of this paper must be held tentatively, if it is to 
be held rationally.33,34 
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